CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS by unknown
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
JoHN L. HANNAFORD




ARcmE E. ALBRIGHT, JR.
JOHN BARKER
ALEX. BROOKS
MERRELL E. CLARK, JR.


























Jo V. MoRGAN, JR.
ORin S. PuRINTUN






MARIE MCMAHON, Business Secrelary
Subscription price $5.00 per year This number, $1.oo
Canadian subscription price $5.50 per year; Foreign, $5.75 per year;
for prices on other issues inquire
Yale Law Journal Company, Inc., Box 4o1A, Yale Station, 1rew Haren, Conn.
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
ON November 21, 1941, an Act to extend the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court to procedure for the punishment of criminal contempt' re-
ceived executive approval. Ostensibly to bridge a gap in the previous rule-
making authorization created by a decision which in effect ld held that the
Court was empowered to regulate all procedure "except proceedings to punish
for criminal contempt of court,"3 it is the first Congressional legislation re-
ferring in terms to criminal contempt0 In accordance with this enabling Act,
1. 55 STAT. 779 (1941), 18 U.S.C. §6W9 (Supp. 1946).
2. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1178, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) ; SEN. REP. No. 763, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941).
4. But cf. 28 U.S.C. §§387, 388 (1940) where through an ambiguous compilation
reference is made specifically to "criminal" contempt. Comparison with the original
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Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was adopted, effective
March 21, 1946, to codify criminal contempt procedure for the first time.
The recent Congressional recognition of a classification of criminal con-
tempt implies its civil counterpart. But no federal legislation purporting to
regulate civil contempt has ever been enacted and it remains an open question
whether even general contempt legislation, with the possible exception of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 5 is applicable to civil contempt.0
Yet on March 20, 1947, for the violation of a restraining order, a labor
union was fined $700,000 for criminal contempt and, conditionally, $2,800,000
for civil contempt by a mandate of the Supreme Court.1 Following shortly
thereafter, a controversy over the proper disposition of contempt charges was
renewed between Justice Rutledge and Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
under circumstances indicating uncertainty as to the ultimate alignment of the
majority of the Court. Mr. Justice Rutledge re-emphasizes the necessity of
maintaining a clear-cut difference between civil and criminal contempt justi-
fiable upon "historical grounding and constitutional compulsion" while the
latter assert that "contempt proceedings are sni generis. . . . They are not to
be circumscribed by procedural formalities or by traditional limitations of
what are ordinarily called crimes, except insofar as due process of law and the
other standards of decency and fairness in the administration of federal jus-
tice may require." The controversy focuses attention upon serious inade-
quacies in the existing federal law of contempt and invites examination of the
mechanism by which the power of the federal courts is made effective.
statute, 38 STAT. 738-9 (1914), which in this respect has never been amended, indicates
that the word "criminal" has been added by the Committee on Revision of the Laws, and
not by Congress. The ambiguity has been incorporated into 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 387, 388 (Supp.
1946), but not into 8 FED. CODE ANN., tit. 28, §§ 387, 388 (1937, Supp. 1946). For a
collection of federal statutory provisions enumerating contempts, see Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules, FED. R. CRIm. P. 42 (1946).
5. 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §111 (1940).
6. See Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup. Ct. 918, 923 (1947) (assuming only arguendo
that the basic federal contempt statute, REv. STAT. §725 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §385 (1940),
governs civil as well as criminal contempt) ; In re Sixth & Wisconsin Tower, Inc., 108
F.2d 538, 544 (C.C.A. 7th 1939) (concurring opinion), 54 HARv. L. REv. 137 (1940)
(arguing that the statute applies only to criminal contempt). Application is usually
assumed without question, as in the majority opinion, id. at 540, or ignored, as in Lamb
v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932).
7. United Mine Workers v. United States, 67 Sup.Ct. 677 (Mar. 6, 1947); 67
Sup.Ct. 976 (Mat. 17, 1947).
8. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup.Ct. 918, 924 (Mar. 31, 1947) (concurring opinion
based upon his dissent in United Mine Workers v. United States, supra note 7 at 730).
9. Penfield Co. v. SEC, supra note 8 at 930 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Jack-
son may have been committed to the proposition that contempt is sid gencris three weeks
previously by his brief concurring opinion in United Mine Workers v. United States, 67
Sup.Ct. 677, 703 (1947) ; for he there subscribed to a civil as well as a criminal con-
tempt fine although maintaining that the court contemned had no jurisdiction to issue
the restraining order violated, a circumstance which has traditionally defeated a judgment
for civil contempt. See id. at 696.
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BACKGROUND-THE BASIC FEDERAL CONTEMPT STATUTE
A comprehensive definition of contempt of court has rarely been judicially
attempted with success. Two state court definitions may be suggested as suf-
ficiently vague to include all recorded federal contempt: contempt is an act in
"disregard of the authority of the court"' 0 or against "the integrity of the
court.""u A similar amorphous conception appears to have been the basis of
the contempt provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferring upon the
courts of the United States the power "to punish by fine or imprisonment, at
the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hear-
ing before the same."''
The Supreme Court early adopted the position that contempt is a "specific
criminal offense,"'-3 a position not discarded officially until 1904. 4 The classi-
fication, however, carried with it none of the safeguards commonly associated
with the prosecution of crimes. For the power to punish contempt of court
was metaphysically conceived as "inherent,"' a conception which served not
only to remove contempt from the protection of general criminal statutes but
also to induce the emasculation of specific contempt legislation.' The im-
10. In re MacKnight, 11 Mont. 126, 135, 27 Pac. 336, 338 (1891).
11. In re Merrill, 88 N.J. Eq. 261, 267, 102 At. 400, 402 (1917).
12. 1 STrAT. 83 (1789) (italics added).
13. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (U.S. 1822). "... for when a court commits a
party for a contempt, their adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment, in conse-
quence, is execution." Id. at 43.
14. See p. 92 infra.
15. See Respublica v. Oswald, 1 DalL 319, 329 (Sup. Ct. Penn. 1783); United
States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (U.S. 1812); Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227
(U.S. 1821) ; Ex parte Robinson, 19 ValL 505, 510 (U.S. 1874) ; cf. 3 STOnY, CONSTI-
TUTION, §§1497, 1768 (1833) [§§1503, 1774, in 5th ed. 1891]. The doctrine receives more
than metaphysical support, however, from the principle of separation of powers. In the
first place, it is urged that "the right of self-protection and self-preservation" lies in its
acceptance; "and be it said to the credit of many courts who have not bowed to popular
enthusiasm... they unqualifiedly adhere to the doctrine." 1 BAILEY, HAMs Conrus
221 (1913) (comparing the doctrine in state and federal courts) ; cf. Chief Justice White
in Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541 (1917). Having granted the necessity of the
contempt power to self-preservation, it follows that its abridgment by Congress will di-
rectly affect the independence of the judiciary. For "without it they (the courts] are
mere boards of arbitration whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory."
Gompers v. Bucks' Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). The extent to
which a separation of powers is thought to be constitutionally required will therefore
determine the extent of permissible regulation. For criticism of the "inherent" power
theory as designed to achieve a separation of powers, with the suggestion that a com-
peting principle of constitutional construction stressing "checks and balances" is equally
feasible, see Chief Justice Taft in Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 119-"0 (1925);
THoMAs, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 85-9 (1934). Compare H. R. REP. No.
613, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1912) w4th H. IL REP. No. 613 pt. 2 (minority rep.) 4-7.
For general criticism, see DANGEL, CoNTEmPr § 42, 42A (1939) ; Frankfurter and Landis,
Power to Regudate Conlempts, 37 HAzv. L. REv. 1010, 1012-23 (1924).
16. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924) [limiting construction given to
1947]
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munity thus achieved from Congressional interference was matched by im-
munity from constitutional restriction with the doctrine, of "immemorial
usage," that contempt is not amenable to the provisions governing trial of
traditional offenses and, in particular, to trial by jury. 17 In addition, there
being no general criminal appellate jurisdiction,18 the classification insured
that neither appeal nor writ of error would lie from any contempt judgment
to the Supreme Court.19
It is not surprising that the royal prerogative vested in a single judge as
prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner was early abused. Consequently, fol-
lowing the abortive impeachment proceedings against Federal Judge James H.
Peck, who had disbarred and imprisoned an attorney for publishing a criticism
of his opinion pending its review by a higher court,20 Congress in 1831 passed
an Act "declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court."-" As com-
bined in the Judicial Code with the 1789 provisions, w2 the Act recognizes but
three categories of offenses punishable as contempt: 1) misbehavior "in the
38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U.S.C. §§386-90 (1940)]; Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918) [limiting construction given to REv. STAT. §725 (1875), 28
U.S.C. §385 (1940)]; see pp. 94 and 87 infra. That the contempt power of the lower
federal courts may be regulated by Congress has not, however, been successfully denied,
although applicability of contempt legislation to the Supreme Court, an express creature
of the Constitution, remains undecided. See Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510-1
(U.S. 1874), Michaelson v. United States, supra at 66.
17. ip re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895); Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134
U.S. 31 (1890) ; see Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) ; Ex parte Burr,
4 Fed. Cas. No. 2186, at 797 (C.C. D.C. 1823). For the origin of this doctrine, see Fox,
THE HISTORY OF CoNTEmPT OF COURT 4-15 (1927) where it is traced to a dictum in an
undelivered opinion by Wilmot, J., King v. Almon (K.B. 1765) in WILMOT, Nomvs OF
OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS 243 (1802). Fox has demonstrated that the doctrine, far
from being "of immemorial usage," is virtually unsupported by common law precedents
prior to 1720. Fox, op. cit. .upra at 112-6. The error, nevertheless, via Blackstone, has
permeated the law of England, id. 16-33, and that of the United States, Frankfurter and
Landis, supra note 15, at 1042-58. See also United Mine Workers v. United States, 67
Sup.Ct. 677, 732 n. (dissenting opinion).
18. See p. 92 infra.
19. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (U.S. 1822) (habeas corpus will not lie to re-
view indirectly erroneous contempt decree which could be reviewed only upon certificate
of division in opinion below) ; New Orleans v. Steamship Co,, 20 Wall. 387 (U.S, 1874)
(no appeal from contempt decree) ; Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U.S. 121 (1880) (no writ of
error from contempt decree) ; cf. 2 STAT. 159 (1802) (review of criminal cases by Su-
preme Court only upon certificate of division), United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159,
172 (U.S. 1805). There is talk in the early cases that the power to control contempt
rests by nature exclusively with the contemned court and is not subject to review by any
other court regardless of appellate criminal jurisdiction.
20. For the history of this famous episode, see STANSBURY, RErORT OF TulE TRIAL OF
JA ES H. PECK (1833); Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 15, at 1024-7; TnoMAs,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 25-7; Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication, 28 COL. L.
REV. 401, 423-31 (1928).
21. Act, March 2, 1831, §1, 4 STAT. 487 (1831).
22. REv. STAT. §725 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §385 (1940) (JUDICIAL CODE §268).
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presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice," 2) misbehavior of an officer of the court "in official transactions,"
and 3) disobedience or resistance to a "lawful" court order.
GROWTH OF SUBSTANTivE LImITATIONS ON THE POWER TO PUNISH
MISBEHAVIOR
Although nominally "declaratory," the general misbehavior provision, ap-
parently applicable only to what is now termed criminal contempt,2 has
proved to be a substantial limitation on the contempt power. Since its passage
followed directly the impeachment of Judge Peck, it would seem that Con-
gress intended at least to restrict the summary punishment of misbehavior so
remote as to constitute only constructive contempt.2 4 Such an interpretation is
reinforced by the inclusion within the original Act of a second section mak-
ing the endeavor corruptly to "influence, intimidate, or impede any witness,
juror," or court officer, or to "obstruct or impede the due administration of
justice" 5 a criminal offense to be prosecuted only by indictment. Moreover,
such was the construction adopted by the first federal court to pass upon the
legislation, which held that the clause "so near thereto as to obstruct the ad-
ministration of justice" in the misbehavior provision must be read in conjunc-
tion with "presence" and thus requires physical, not merely causal, prox-
imity.6 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in 1918, approving the punishment
of contempt by newspaper publication, held that a reasonable tendency to
Obstruct the due administration of justice regardless of geographical nearness
to the court was sufficient to support the federal contempt power - and added
that "the provision conferred no power not already granted and imposed no
limitations not already existing."28
The sequel to this subsequently unpopular decision was the collection and
distribution of legal ammunition by outraged contempt scholars - With the
result that the test of physical proximity was re-established in 1941 by the
23. In. re Sixth & Wisconsin Tower, Inc., 108 F2d 538 (C.C.A. 7th 1939) semble.
24. The brief legislative history of the Act is contained in unpublished House and
Senate Journal entries, a transcript of which may be found in Frankfurter and Landis,
supra note 15 at 1026n.
25. Act, March 2, 1831, §2, 4 STAT. 488, from which 35 STAT. 1113 (1909), as
amended 59 STAT. 234 (1945), 18 U.S.C. §241 (Supp. 1946) derives. This section has
been broadly construed and, although permitting a full criminal trial and therefore not
as immediate, appears effective in punishing bribery, intimidation, or improper influencing
of jurors or witnesses. See, e.g., Samples v. United States, 121 F.2d 263 (C.C.A. 5th
1941).
26. Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed.Cas. 1205, No. 11,350 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1835) ; Soo Ex
parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 511 (U.S. 1873) ; cf. United States v. Emerson, 25 Fed.Cas.
No. 15,050, at 1012 (C.C.D.C. 1831).
27. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
28. Id. at 418.
29. Felix Frankfurter and James AL Landis, supra note 15, at 1010; Walter Nelles
and Carol NV. King, supra note 20 at 525; and C. H. THoMAs, op. cit. mtpra note 15.
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decision in Nye v. United States.3 0 Presumably, the second section of the Act
of 1831 must also be re-interpreted from a mere provision for the cumulative
or alternative punishment of out of court contemnors to the exclusive method
of reaching contempt by publication, bribery of a witness, or the improper
influencing or intimidation of jurors. It is true that the opinion of the court
appeared to sanction the punishment of such offenses as contempt if com-
mitted near the courtroom although without physical disturbance of the pro-
ceedings,3' but, in view of the unequivocal statement that "meticulous regard
for those separate categories of offenses must be had, so that the instances
where there is no right to jury trial will be narrowly restricted,"3 caution
dictates questionable acceptance of so mechanical a construction. 3 At any
rate, the area of overlap in practice will be smallM since the bribery of a wit-
ness under the nose of the judge, for example, will not be frequently at-
tempted and the occasions upon which such an offense can be consummated
in the witness room and hallway will be limited.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has shown no tendency to recede from its
strict interpretation of the contempt power,35 but, on the contrary, the direc-
tion has been to deprive even the state courts, under the guise of the Four-
teenth Amendment, of the power to punish contempt by publication unless the
latter presents a "clear and present danger" to the administration of justice.
30. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
31. Cited without apparent disapproval: Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889) (at-
tempting to bribe witnesses in jury room and hallway); Sinclair v. United States, 279
U.S. 749 (1929) (shadowing jurors near the courtroom). Since the Nye decision, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held contempt an attempt to influence
a juror thirty feet from the court entrance. Higgins v. United States, 160 F.2d 223
(App.D.C. 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup.Ct. 1511 (1947) ; see 54 HARV. L. REv, 1398 (1941).
32. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 49 (1941).
33. See Pendergast v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 687 (C.C.A. 8th 1942) (dissenting
opinion) rev'd 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
34. As indicative of the trend since the Nye decision, see, e.g., United States v.
Welch, 154 F.2d 705 (C.C.A. 3d 1946) (influencing prospective jurors fourteen miles
from court necessitating discharge of entire panel not punishable as contempt although
an offense under no other statute) ; McKee v. United States, 126 F.2d 470 (C.C.A. 6th
1942) (attempting to influence juror two blocks from court not contempt) ; Wimberly
v. United States, 119 F.2d 713 (C.C.A. 5th 1941) (attempting to influence juror sixty
miles from court not contempt) ; cf. Schmidt v. United States, 124 F.2d 177 (C.C.A. 6th
1941) (filing of derogatory affidavit in court clerk's office while court is in recess not
contempt) ; Millinocket Theatre, Inc., v. Kurson, 39 F.Supp. 979 (D. Maine 1941) (wil-
ful destruction of prospective evidence not contempt). But cf. Higgins v. United States,
160 F.2d 223 (App. D.C. 1946) cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 1511 (1947) (attempting to in-
fluence juror thirty feet from entrance to court held contempt).
35. See In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52 (1943) (refusing to decide whether intimidating
witness in corridor adjoining court room is punishable as contempt, but reversing a con-
tempt sentence on other grounds); Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 416
(1943) (refusing to decide whether obtaining a court decree through bribery and fraudu-
lent misrepresentations some of which were made in the actual presence of the court is
punishable as contempt, but reversing a contempt sentence on other grounds).
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No such danger has yet been recognized in the three state publication cases
reversed since the Nye decision. G
The drastic restriction of the power of punishing misbehavior to direct as
distinguished from constructive contempt thus eliminates from federal prac-
tice a substantial element of the controversy raging over abuse of the con-
tempt prerogative. There appears to be general approval of the limited power
of the judge to maintain order and decorum within the court room, and to
protect the bench from derogatory remarks addressed orally or by affidavit of
disqualification. Moreover, for contempts committed in the face of the
court, as distinguished from other direct contempts,38 no jury is needed to
assist in determination of the facts and no extension of time for preparation
of defense is required; but on the contrary, to be effective, there should be im-
mediate penal vindication of the court's dignity.
Even control over direct contempt, however, has not been without qualifica-
tion. Perjury, frequently punished as contempt by exasperated courts dis-
trustful of the cumbersome but safeguarded criminal procedure, was held in
Ex parte Hudgings"9 to be beyond reach of the contempt power unless to the
essential elements of perjury is added "the further element of obstruction to
the court in the performance of its duty."4 0 The ground for requiring this
precaution was said to be the danger that the unrestricted power to punish
perjury might become a legal thumbscrew to exact "a character of testimony
which the court would deem to be truthful."4 1' The result in the Hudgings
case has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court,42 but with a shift of
emphasis to the policy underlying the Nye decision: to exclude as far as pos-
sible from the area of contempt punishment offenses triable by jury. Perjury,
it is thus indicated, is not summarily punishable at all, although its incidence
36. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) ; Craig v. Harney, 67 Sup.Ct. 1249 (1947). Mr. Justice Frankfurter criticizes
the similarity of result reached on dissimilar grounds: "It is an inadmissible jump from
finding that conduct is not contempt within the federal Act, to finding that an exertion of
State power offended the Fourteenth Amendment. .. There is not a breath of a sug-
gestion in the opinion in the Nye case that the restricted geographic meaning which the
Court gave to the Act of Congress designed to limit the power of the lower federal
courts was required by constitutional considerations." Id. at 1260 (dissenting opinion).
37. Laughlin v. United States, 151 F2d 281 (App. D.C. 1945) cert. denicd, 326 U.S.
777 (1945); United States v. Bollenbach, 125 F.2d 458 (C.C.A. 2d 1942). But cf.
Schmidt v. United States, 124 F.2d 177 (C.C.A. 6th 1941).
38. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) (derogatory letter addressed to
judge in chambers is not summarily punishable although constituting contempt "in the
presence of the court" since it is not "in the face of the court ' ) ; FEa. R. Crun. P. 42
(1946) (contempt not seen or heard by the judge in the "actual presence" of the court
is not summarily punishable). See note 72 iufra.
39. 249 U.S. 378 (1919).
40. Id. at 383.
41. Id. at 384.
42. It re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945). See also United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Goldstein, 158 F.2d 916 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
19471
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to the clear obstruction of justice administration "does not immunize the
culprit from contempt proceedings." 43 The character of obstruction necessary
to invoke contempt reprisal is illustrated by two previous opinions cited with
apparent approval :44 1) the misrepresentations of a prospective juror in order
to qualify45 and 2) the evasive answer of a witness which on its face and with-
out inquiry collaterally is "not a bona fide effort to answer the questions at
all."
46
The overlap in misbehavior between crime and contempt has thus been ef-
fectively narrowed. So long as contempt be punishable without the safe-
guards of a criminal trial, such a policy seems clearly desirable.
PARALLEL GROWTH OF CIVIL CONTEMPT WITH PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS
ON THE POWER TO PUNISH DISOBEDIENCE
The need for a limitation on the judicial power to compel obedience came
dramatically to the public attention in connection with abuse in the issuance of
labor injunctions. In 1894, Eugene Debs and the American Railway Union,
embroiled in a labor dispute, conducted a strike and boycott of a Pullman
Company which interrupted freight and passenger service in the Chicago
area. The ensuing national dislocation led the Attorney General to invoke the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act by securing an ex parte restraining order against
interference "in any way or manner" with railroads engaged in interstate com-
merce, thus rendering the subsequent violation of a criminal law punishable in
a contempt proceeding. As a result, the not unexpected disregard of the re-
straining order was followed by the imprisonment of Debs and other officers
of the union after a hearing before a single judge.47
A solution to the problem represented by the Debs case was complicated by
an aspect of contemptuous disobedience not generally associated with misbe-
havior in that disobedience may affect directly not only the authority of the
court but the remedy of an adverse party as well.48 For this reason, the
judiciary appears to have approached the problem through the separation of
civil from criminal contempt so as to limit the prerogative of the offended
court without impairing the remedy of the offended party.40
By a convenient fiction, the more enlightened federal courts had provided
43. In re Michael, mspra note 42, at 228.
44. Ibid.
45. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933). See also United States v. Lampkin,
66 F.Supp. 821 (S.D. Fla. 1946).
46. Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Appel, 211 Fed. 495, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1913). See pp. 102-3 infra.
47. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Il1. 1894), writ of error demied,
159 U.S. 251 (1895) ; habeas corpus denied, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
48. See Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904).
49. A distinction between civil and criminal contempt was recognized in England
and in many of the United States long before its acceptance by the federal courts. It
has been traced in Briefs for Respondent and for the United States as atuicus curiae, Ex
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remedial relief for contempt as early as 1869, although the offense was sup-
posed to be a criminal one, in the form of a "fine" pa)-able to the clerk of
court for the benefit of the complainant ;aO or where special elements of contu-
macy were found the fine was made payable part to the complainant and part
to the Unitel Statesl on the implied assumption that it was immaterial to the
guilty to whom went the proceeds. To enforce payment of the fine, accepted
practice was to commit the contemnor until he contributed.*- A description of
these aspects of contempt in terms civil and criminal was not illogical, and the
parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 94, 103 (1925) to King v. Myers, 1 Dun. & E. 265 (K.B.
1786) (contemnor may be attached on Sunday for the benefit of a private party but not
for criminal punishment), and Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. & M. 639, 39
Eng. Rep. 538 (Ch. 1831) (privilege of parliament is defense against attachment for
"civil" not "criminal" contempt). See RAPALJE, CONTEMPT §21 (1884); Beale, Con-
tempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARv. L. REv. 161, 168 (1903).
50. See, e.g., In re Mullee, 17 Fed.Cas. 968, No 9911 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1869); Double-
day v. Sherman, 7 Fed.Cas. 959, No. 4020 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1870) ; In re Tilt, 11 Fed. 463
(E.D.N.Y. 1881); Searls v. Worden, 13 Fed. 716 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 182) rcv'd on
other grounds, 121 U.S. 14 (1887); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 19
Fed. 20 (C.C.D.Ore. 1884); In re North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 27 Fed. 795
(C.C.D. Calif. 1886); Stahl v. Ertel, 62 Fed. 920 (C.C.S.D. Ill. 1893); Indianapolis
Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 75 Fed. 972 (C.C.D.Ind. 1896) ; Economist Fur-
nace Co. v. Wrought-Iron Range Co., 86 Fed. 1010 (C.C.D. Ind. 1898). For a typical
contempt decree of this type see Fischer v. Hayes, 6 Fed. 63, 67 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881).
Contra: United States ex rel. D. & N. 0. Ry. v. Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry., 16
Fed. 853 (C.C.D.Colo. 1883); Kirk v. Milwaukee Dust Collector Mfg. Co., 26 Fed. 501
(C.C.E.D.Wis. 1885); see United States v. Berry, 24 Fed. 780, 783 (C.C.V.D.Mo.
1885); cf. Chisolm v. Caines, 121 Fed. 397 (C.C.D.S.C. 1903).
51. Craig v. Fisher, 6 Fed. Cas. 725, No. 3332 (C.C.D.Calif. 1873) ; Sabin v. Fogarty,
70 Fed. 482 (C.C.D.Wash. 1895); Cary Mfg. Co. v. Acme Flexible Clasp Co., 103 Fed.
873 (C.C.A. 2d 1901) writ of error dismissed, 187 U.S. 4-7 (1903); Chicago Directory
Co. v. United States Directory Co., 123 Fed. 194 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1903); Christensen
Engineering Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 121 Fed. 562 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903),
130 Fed. 735 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904), 135 Fed. 774 (C.C.A. 2d 1905) (affirming as to fine
payable to United States, but reversing as to fine payable to complainant with instruc-
tions to reassess to correspond with actual damages suffered); Continental Gin Co. v.
Murray Co., 162 Fed. 873 (CC.A. 3d 1903); cf. Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, 19 Fed. 810
(C.C. D. Mass. 1884).
52. Fischer v. Hayes, 6 Fed. 63 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881). See cases cited notes 50-51
stpra. The practice does not violate Rxv. STAT. §725 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §385 (1940),
conferring only the power to punish by "fine or imprisonment" (italics added) since "if
there be a commitment for non-payment of the fine, there must be a discharge as soon as
the fine is paid... The payment of the fine, and a commitment for not paying it, can-
not coexist." Fischer v. Hayes supra at 71; cf. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup. Ct. 918,
923 (1947).
Of course, commitment of the type indicated was not restricted to enforcing the
payment of fines. See e.g., In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157, 168 (U.S. 1874) (party refusing
to obey any lawful order of court should be "fined and imprisoned until he performs the
act required of him or shows that it is not in his power to do it") ; In re Allen, 1 Fed.
Cas. No. 208, at 438 (C.C.D.Vt. 1876) (party refusing to comply with order to produce
books and papers may be imprisoned "until he be discharged by order of court") ; United
19471
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court was soon confronted with a final decree in a suit for patent
infringement containing a purely civil award to the complainant of compensa-
tion for contempt.5 By reviewing on appeal and reversing on the merits,"
the Court recognized that this at least was not a criminal offense of which it
had no appellate jurisdiction.
The second step in the breakdown of contempt as a criminal offense
followed a series of Congressional enactments beginning in 1874r5 and cul-
minating in the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1 8 9 1 ,o which established for the
first time general criminal appellate jurisdiction. In the course of a more
precise examination of the procedural differences between civil and criminal
appeals, it was discovered that contempt involved both aspects and in 1904 the
dichotomy was offitially born with the initial separation of civil and criminal
contempt for the purposes of review.5 7 '
Self-imposed restrictions upon the power to punish disobedience were
States v. Sowles, 16 Fed. 536 (D.Vt. 1883) (bankrupt refusing to comply with order to
turn over funds fraudulently retained from assignee may be recommitted indefinitely dur-
ing his continued disobedience); cf. Sabin v. Fogarty, 70 Fed. 482, 485 (C.C.D.Wash.
1895) (announcing that any delay in paying a contempt fine will be regarded "as a con-
tinuing and additional contempt" subject to $50 additional fine per day).
Indefinite confinement to the Fleet was, prior to 1839, the normal method of en-
forcing the in personam decrees of the English Court of Chancery. See 2 DANIELL,
PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT or CHANCERY 698, 708-9, 721 (1st ed. 1840); Beale,
supra note 49 at 169-71.
53. Searls v. Worden, 13 Fed. 716 (C.C.E.D.Mich. 1882).
54. Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. 14 (1887). Cf. Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U.S. 121
(1880), 7 Fed. 96 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881). Means of review other than writ of error or
appeal were also being devised to supervise contempt decrees. Ex parte Robinson, 19
Wall. 505 (U.S. 1874) (mandamus); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)
(habeas corpus) ; In re Chetwood, 165 U.S. 443 (1897) (certiorari) ; and writ of error
was held appropriate to review a contempt judgment in a state court, Tinsley v. Ander-
son, 171 U.S. 101 (1898).
55. 18 STAT. 254 (1874) (authorizing writ of error from the U.S. Supreme Court
to the Supreme Court, Territory of Utah, to review a sentence to capital punishment or a
conviction for polygamy); 20 STAT. 354 (1879) (authorizing writ of error from the
Circuit Courts to the District Courts in criminal cases where the sentence is imprison-
ment or fine in excess of $300) ; 25 STAT. 656 (1889) (authorizing writ of error from
the Supreme Court to Circuit Courts to review capital crime convictions).
56. 26 SwAT. 826 (1891) as amended, 29 STAT. 492 (1897). § 2 established the Circuit
Courts of Appeal; § 4 deprived the Circuit Courts of appellate jurisdiction; § 5 author-
ized a writ of error from the Supreme Court to the Circuit and District Courts in cases
of capital crimes; § 6 authorized writs of error from the Circuit Courts of Appeal to
the Circuit and District Courts in all other criminal cases. For legislative history of
criminal appeals in the federal courts see United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 319-323
(1892) ; 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 332 n., 727 (1928).
57. Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904). A judgment for criminal
contempt even though rendered in the midst of a civil action is immediately reviewable,
formerly by writ of error, ibid., at present by appeal, Wilson v. Byron Jackson Co,, 93
F.2d 577 (C.C.A. 9th 1937) ; whereas a judgment for civil contempt must await the final
decree in the civil suit, Fox.v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105 (1936). A contempt judgment
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initiated simultaneously with the final step in separating the two categories of
contempt undertaken in 1911. Reversing a sentence which imposed a fixed
term of imprisonment for violation of a labor injunction, the Supreme Court,
in Gompers v. Bucks' Stove and Range Co.,0 8 denied the power of the federal
courts to punish for criminal contempt in a civil proceeding upon the ground
that prejudice to certain vaguely specified rights of the criminal contemnor
might otherwise result.59 To determine the correct classification of contempt,
the Court suggested a rule of legal consequences based upon the character and
purpose of the punishment, a rule since generally followed by the federal
courts. "If it is for civil contempt the punishment is renedial, and for the
benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is
punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court."'0 0 By its ingenious adapta-
tion of "punishment" as the fulcrum upon which the two categories of con-
tempt are balanced, however, the Court was able to include within the civil
"remedial" classification sanctions whose effectiveness directly reflects upon
the power to administer justice: 1) compcnsation to the injured party and 2)
coercive relief by fine or imprisonment if made conditional upon the failure of
the contemnor to purge himself.(" The additional protection extended to the
criminal contemnor by the Gonmpers case, therefore, would seem to be avail-
able only in the event that it is necessary to invoke an unconditional fine or
fixed term of imprisonment in supplemental vindication of the court's au-
thority.
The Congressional approach to the problem represented by the Debs case
was first exemplified in general contempt legislation appended to the Clayton
embracing both a civil and criminal penalty is reviewed in its entirety as a judgment in
criminal contempt Matter of Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U.S. 458 (1904) ; In re
Merchant's Stock and Grain Co. 223 U.S. 639 (1912). A judgment for civil contempt
may be reviewed by the contempt plaintiff, Ingraham Co. v. Germanow, 4 F. 2d 1002
(C.C.A. 2d 1925); Waterman Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 202 Fed. 167 (C.C.A. 6th
1913) ; whereas a judgment for criminal contempt may not, United States v. Bittner,
11 F.2d 93 (C.C.A. 4th 1926). In initiating the review, conformance with civil pro-
cedure was once required in both cases, Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), but
practice appears to have re-established the civil-criminal distinction, Moore v. United
States, 150 F2d 323 (C.C.A. 10th 1945) cert. denied, 326 U.S. 740 (1945). But see
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 697n. (1944).
58. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
59. The court indicated as possibly prejudicial to a defendant exposed to a criminal
penalty in a civil contempt proceeding: 1) moving papers entitled as a suit rather than
as a charge, 2) evidence bearing on severity of sentence taken from the actual equity
proceeding, 3) defendant required to testify. Id. at 446-S.
60. Id. at 441 (italics added).
61. Id. at 442. The Supreme Court held coercive relief to be a cvil contempt sanc-
tion for the first time in Doyle v. London Guarantee Co., 204 U.S. 599 (1907), although
this was implicit in the previous civil classification of compensatory fines enforced by im-
prisonment. The converse proposition that coercive relief is never a criminal sanction
would not necessarily follow, however; nevertheless, the Gompers dictum seems to have
continued unquestioned. But see notes 111-3 infra.
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Act in 1914, providing that an act of disobedience which is also a crime under
federal or state statute entitles the contemnor to a jury trial conforming "as
near as may be to the practice in criminal cases."'0 2 Exceptions, however,
seriously undermined its effectiveness, for the Act by its terms does not apply
where the contempt has arisen out of an action prosecuted by the United
States nor where the contempt has been committed in the presence of the
court or "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."oa A
narrow interpretation by the judiciary further restricted its scope with the
result that the Act is more a matter of historical interest than a safeguard
against abuse of the contempt power. In addition to a strict limitation of ap-
plicability to "crime in the ordinary sense"04 and in some doubtful cases a
further restriction of applicability to contempt "within the purview" of the
Clayton Act as a whole,65 the significant condition attached to judicial ac-
ceptance of the Act's contempt provisions, despite reasonably clear legislative
intention to the contrary, is that they are held not to affect the prosecution of
civil contempt.66
62. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U.S.C. §§386-90 (1940). Other provisions of the Act
include: maximum fine payable by a natural person to the United States is $1000 and
maximum imprisonment, six months, or both (§387) ; prosecution under the Act must be
commenced within one year after commission of the contempt (§390).
63. 38 STAT. 739 (1914), 28 U.S.C. §389 (1940); United States v. Goldman, 277
U.S. 229 (1928); Hill v. United States ex reL. Weiner, 300 U.S. 105 (1937) (contempt
arising out of action brought by United States) ; Redman v. United States, 77 F.2d 126
(C.C.A. 9th 1935) ; Couts v. United States, 249 Fed. 595 (C.C.A. 8th 1918) (contempt in
the presence of.the court).
64. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924); Armstrong v. United
States, 18 F.2d 371 (C.C.A. 7th 1927) ; Taliaferro v. Utiited States, 290 Fed, 906 (C.C.A.
4th 1923).
65. McGibbony v. Lancaster, 286 Fed. 129 (C.C.A. 5th 1923). Contra: Sandefur v.
Canoe Creek, 293 Fed. 379 (C.C.A. 6th 1923), 4 F.2d 1022 (C.C.A. 6th 1924); cf.
Michaelson v. United States, supra note 64, at 69 (expressly leaving the question open).
In Maynard v. United States, 23 F.2d 141 (App. D.C. 1927) the decision denying a jury
trial to the contemnor was also put squarely on this ground, but as the contempt there
committed was in violation of a liquor injunction issued under the National Prohibition
Act, 41 STAT. 315 (1919), which expressly provided for summary contempt punishment,
Woodside v. United States, 60 F.2d 823 (C.C.A. 4th 1932), the reason assigned was
clearly unnecessary.
66. Mich~elson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) ; Odell v. Baisch & Lomb
Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359 (C.C.A. 7th 1937) cert. denied, 302 U.S. 756 (1937) (alternate
holding).
There is nothing in the wording of the statute that indicates any Congressional rec-
ognition of the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, fully accepted by the
Supreme Court itself but three years before its passage. See note 4 supra. Nor does
the explanation offered to the House by its author invite such an interpretation. H.R.
REP. No. 613, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1912). The argument that the statute applies only
to criminal contempt appears to rest on such language as: "any person who shall will-
fully disobey . . ." (italics added); and contempt also constituting "a criminal offense
. . ' But neither of these provisions rules out applicability to "civil" contempt as de-
fined by the Gompers test, which made the distinction between civil and criminal con-
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Dissatisfaction with the operation of the Clayton Act induced passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act"7 designed to remedy only those abuses arising out of
the granting of injunctions in labor disputes68 by providing a jury trial for
contempt arising "under this Act."'6 9 Like the earlier statute, however, the
Act is inapplicable on its face to contempt in the presence of the court, but
only to contempt "so near thereto as to interfere directly with the administra-
tion of justice." 70 Although it applies theoretically in civil contempt proceed-
ings to the same extent as in proceedings for criminal contempt, the limited
jurisdiction left to the courts in the issuance of labor injunctions has ap-
parently produced but a single case to test its applicability in this respect. In
a contempt proceeding arising out of a suit instituted by the United States in
its capacity as employer, the Act was held inapplicable without regard to the
classification of contempt.71
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
On the criminal contempt side, the punishment of either misbehavior or dis-
obedience by an unconditional fine payable to the United States or a fixed term
of imprisonment secures nothing to the private contempt plaintiff except per-
haps a sense of vicarious satisfaction, although it may have a deterrent effect
on future contempts. At least when confined to these sanctions for its control,
contempt may well be analogized to crime, once an offense against the court is
recognized as equivalent to an offense against the United States. The premise
of the Anglo-American criminal law that the rights of the individual are more
jealously to be guarded than the prerogative of the sovereign becomes, there-
fore, equally applicable to criminal contempt.
Accordingly, the Gompers case has been followed by judicial extension of
tempt a technical one based, not upon the nature of the act, but upon the "character and
purpose of the punishment." The Act, however, expressly provides as "punishment" a
fine payable to "the United States or to the complainant or other parly injured by the act
constituting the contempt" (italics added).
67. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§101-115 (1040).
68. SWAYZEE, CONTEMPT OF COLRT iN LABOR IvJu.c:ro.x CASs 107-8 (1935);
THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 44-5; Chamberlain, The Federal Anti-Inuitction Act,
18 A.B.A.J. 477 (1932) ; Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional Power over the Labor
Injunction, 31 COL. L. REv. 385 (1931).
69. 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §111 (1940). The Act also provides that a con-
tempt defendant may demand the disqualification of a judge to hear the proceeding if
the contempt arose from an attack upon his character or conduct not made in the presence
of the court "or so near thereto as to interfere directly with the administration of jus-
tice." 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §11Z (1940). Doubt that this provision applies to
cases not arising under the Norris-LaGuardia Act was expressed in Davis v. SEC, 109
F.2d 6, 8 (C.C.A. 7th 1940) cert. denied 309 U.S. 687 (1940). But FED. R. Cnix. P.
42(b) renders the question academic by adopting a similar provision for all criminal
contempts. See note 73 infra.
70. 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §111 (1940) (italics added).
71. United Mfine Workers v. United States, 67 Sup.Ct. 677, 684, 698 (1947).
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many safeguards to criminal contemnors, culminating in Rule 42 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. Restricting the power of summary punish-
ment to conduct seen or heard by the judge in the actual presence of the court,
Rule 42 requires that criminally contemptuous conduct occurring tinder other
circumstances be prosecuted on notice, with a reasonable time for preparation
of defense, by the judge or an attorney appointed by the court for that pur-
pose ;72 if such conduct should involve disrespect to or criticism of a judge, the
further disqualification of that judge to hear the proceeding is provided for.18
In addition, where it is not inconsistent with the limited power of summary pun-
ishment, the defendant accused of criminal contempt may have the following
constitutional safeguards: immunity from double-jeopardy 74 or self-incrimina-
tion,7 r right to notice of the nature and cause of the accusation, right to compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, right to assistance of coun-
sel ;76 and, by extension, the protections of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,77
eligibility for executive pardon,78 immunity from prosecutions instituted after
the three-year limitations period of the Criminal Code, 79 and immunity from
72. Rule 42 also prescribes that the notice "shall state the essential facts constituting
the criminal contempt charged and describe it as uch' (italics added). Cf. McCann v.
New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211 (C.C.A. 2d 1935). This provision has been
modified in United Mine Workers v. United States, 67 Sup.Ct. 677, 698 (1947), to dis-
pense with the necessity for expressly charging the defendant with "criminal contempt"
if he does not suffer "substantial prejudice" thereby.
The particularity required of an indictment is not necessary for an information charg-
ing criminal contempt. United States ex rel. Bowles v. Seidmon, 154 F.2d 228 (C.C.A.
7th 1946). Contra: Bowles v. Bullock, 5 F.R.D. 147 (D.Del. 1945) ; cf. United States v.
Balaban, 26 F.Supp. 491 (N.D.Ill. 1939) (granting motion for bill of particulars).
73. It might be argued that an element of disrespect to the judge is always involved
in disobedience to his orders, but it is clear that Rule 42 is intended to provide disqualifi-
cation under these circumstances only where, in addition to disobedience, there has been
personal disrespect. See the suggestion of Chief Justice Taft in Cooke v. United States,
267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925), and 47 STAT. 73 (1932) 29 U.S.C. §112 (1940), from which
the present rule has been taken. The reason for requiring disqualification in such a case,
however, would seem applicable in a lesser degree to all criminal contempt; namely, the
possibility that justice will be less than impartial where the same judge prosecutes, tries,
and punishes an offense against his own authority.
74. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
75. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) ; Gompers v. Bucks'
Stove Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448 (1911). But see Merchants' Stock and Grain Co. v.
Board of Trade, 201 Fed. 20, 27-9 (C.C.A. 8th 1912).
76. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). On the question of notice see
note 72 supra. On the question of the right to witnesses, cf. Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932).
77. See, e.g., Welling v. United States, 9 F.2d 292 (C.C.A. 6th 1925) ; Stewart v.
United States, 236 Fed. 838 (C.C.A. 8th 1916) ; Schwartz v. United States, 217 Fed. 866
(C.C.A. 4th 1914).
78. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
79. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943) ; Gompers v. United States,
233 U.S. 604 (1914). A one year limitations period applies to contempt- under the Clay-
ton Act. See note 62 supra.
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posthumous suits against his estate.80 On the other hand, he may be liable to
punishment for the disobedience of a court order which has been followed by a
reversal or a settlement of the controversy giving rise to its issuance,8 ' al-
though no civil contempt remedy lies.
8 2
The general expansion of criminal law principles to cover contempt punish-
ment casts doubt upon the propriety of a continued refusal by the federal
courts to extend the privilege of jury trial beyond the narrow scope of the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.8 Legal justification, no longer to be
found in the historically erroneous doctrine of "immemorial usage,"8' has
been sought unsatisfactorily in a semantic differentiation of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution by which the latter is said not to apply
to criminal contempt.8 That this is tacitly regarded as an untenable position
is indicated, however, by the availability to the contemnor of many of the safe-
guards specifically enumerated in the Sixth Amendment under the guise of
80. McGovern v. United States, 280 Fed. 73, (CC.A. 7th 1922). But cf. Wasserman
v. United States, 161 Fed. 722 (C.C.A. 8th 1908) (death of defendant does not abate
civil contempt proceedings). See Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, 43 CoL. I. RE.
780, 808 (1943).
81. See United Mline Workers v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 694 (1947);
Gompers v. Bucks' Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911); Salvage Process
Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 86 F2d 727 (C.C.A. 2d 1936); cf. Worden
v. Searls, 121 U.S. 14 (1887).
82. Gompers v. Bucks' Stove and Range Co. supra note 81 (alternate holding);
Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp. supra note 81; Anargyros
v. Anargyros & Co., 191 Fed. 208 (C.C.N.D.Calif. 1911); see United Mline Workers v.
United States, supra note 81 at 696; cf. Worden v. Searls .spra note 81.
83. A related problem involves the refusal to hold a trial for criminal contempt in
"the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Myers v. United
States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924).
84. See note 17 .supra.
85. This notion made its Supreme Court debut via Myers Y. United States, 264
U.S. 95, 105 (1924), and reappears in Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440
(1932), United Mline Workers v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 731n. (1947) (dis-
senting opinion). Its birthplace is a quotation from Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 563 (1892) cited out of context in Merchants' Stock and Grain Co. v. Board of
Trade, 201 Fed. 20, 28 (C.C.A. 8th 1912): "A criminal prosecution under article 6 of
the amendments is much narrower than a 'criminal case' under article 5 of the amend-
ments." A less formal, but equally unsatisfactory explanation was offered in In re Debs,
158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895): "To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal,
be it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its effi-
ciency.' The latter rationale illustrates two fallacies: 1) that one court may not review
contempt of another court, a conception discarded shortly after general criminal appellate
jurisdiction was established, see note 57 supra; and 2) that violation of a criminal law
requires less efficient prosecution than violation of a court decree. But see Michaelson v.
United States, 266 U.S. 42, 67 (1924) : "The only substantial difference between such a
proceeding as we have here, [contempt] and a criminal prosecution by indictment or in-
formation is that in the latter the act complained of is the violation of a law and in the
former the violation of a decree. In the case of the latter, the accused has a constitutional
right of trial by jury; while in the former he has not."
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the Fifth Amendment "due process" clause."" Whatever reasons may be
urged for securing atrial by jury to the defendant charged with the commis-
sion of a crime would .seem, moreover, equally compelling where he is charged
with criminal contempt not committed in the actual presence of the court.
In addition to the jury problem, however, other inadequacies underlie the
administration of criminal contempt. If additional safeguards are to be con-
fined to criminal contempt proceedings, a prosecution separate from the civil
action would seem necessary lest they be dissipated in the less handicapped
process of settling the score between private litigants. But the prohibition
against criminal punishment in a civil proceeding, theoretically maintained by
compulsion of the Gompers decision, does not preclude the award of civil
relief in a criminal proceeding."' Moreover, the appointment of counsel for a
private litigant to prosecute criminal contempt88 or the substitution of the
United States as a party to a civil contempt proceeding 0 has so vexed the
separation of the two categories that "any given distinction between civil and
criminal contempt may be treated in one case as a basis of the classification
and in another as a consequence of the classification."0 0 A further result is to
permit the chameleon-like transformation of a proceeding commenced in civil
contempt into a criminal prosecution. Thus, in- United Mineworkcrs v.
United States,90 where both penal and coercive fines were imposed in a single
action originally instituted as ancillary to a suit in equity, it was necessary in
order to justify the decision of the Supreme Court to define a criminal pro-
ceeding as one in which the defendants did not suffer "substantial preju-
dice."92
86. See Mr. Justice Rutledge dissenting in United Mine Workers v. United States,
67 Sup. Ct. 677, 731n. (1947). See also note 76 supra.
87. United Mine Workers v. United States, sipra note 86; Union Tool Co. v. Wil-
son, 259 U.S. 107 (1922) (by implication); Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank
v. Wilkinson, 266 U.S. 503 (1925) (by implication); Wilson v. Byron Jackson Co.,
93 F.2d 577 (C.C.A. 9th 1937) ; Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 Fed. 565 (C.C.A. 1st
1911); cf. Morehouse v. Giant Powder Co., 206 Fed. 24 (C.C.A. 9th 1913) ; Merchants'
Stock and Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 Fed. 20 (C.C.A. 8th 1912); Brougham
v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., 205 Fed. 857, 859 (C.C.A. 2d 1913).
88. That private parties were at one time privileged to prosecute criminal contempt
seems to have been unquestioned, Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Amalgamated Assn.
of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, 208 Fed. 335, 344 (S.D. Ohio 1913), but at least two
circuits revoked the privilege prior to FED. R. CraM. P. 42(b). National Popsicle Corp.
v. Kroll, 104 F.2d 259 (C.C.A. 2d 1939); McCauley v. First Trust and Savings Bank,
276 Fed. 117 (C.C.A. 7th 1921); cf. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d
211 (C.C.A. 2d 1935); 46 YALE L. J. 326 (1936). Rule 42 now requires prosecution
either by the judge or an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose. A natural
appointment is the counsel for the injured party who is most likely to bring the contempt
to the court's attention. See, e.g., Bowles v. Camillaci, 53 F. Supp. 976 (W.D.N.Y.
1943); cf. Stewart v. United States, 236 Fed. 838, 842 (C.C.A. 8th 1916).
89. See notes 122-5 infra.
90. Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctlions, 43 COL. L. Rzv. 780, 781, 809-13 (1943).
91. 67 Sup. Ct. 677 (1947).
92. Id. at 700.
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Even if the character of the proceeding to insure that the "criminal element
will dominate" can be satisfactorily fixed once it is begun, the record is barren
of consistent criteria for determining in advance whether disobedience of the
court's command will result in criminal prosecution, civil proceedings, or both.
Any selection of proper criteria, moreover, is complicated by the fact that dis-
obedience is always, technically, an offense to the court even though it may
also impair the remedy of the adverse party.0
3
Finally, the contemnor, within the narrow supervisory protection of ad ap-
pellate court, is usually at the mercy of a single judge in the magnitude of
punishment inflicted. For there is prescribed neither maximum fine nor term
of imprisonment to guide or restrain the arm of justice, unless he is fortunate
enough to qualify under a special statute providing limited contempt pen-
alties 4 Thus, unlike any other federal crime, contempt is not only ill-defined,
but the boundaries of its punishment are unknown. A fine of $700,000 such
as imposed for criminal contempt in the Mincworkers case furnishes no
standard and is the result of no standard customarily associated with the ad-
ministration of criminal law. 5
93. See Merchants' Stock and Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 187 Fed. 393, 401
(C.C.A. 8th 1911) rev'd on other grounds, 223 U.S. 639 (1912); Bullock Elec. & Mfg.
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mlfg. Co., 129 Fed. 105, 106 (C.C.A. 6th 1904) cert. dc-
nied, 194 U.S. 636 (1904); United States v. Anonymous, 21 Fed. 761, 765 (C.C.W.D.
Tenn. 1884). Although this seems to follow by definition, the energy which has been
expended in attempting to differentiate contempt substantively warns of oversimplification
by a priori reasoning. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 Sup. Ct. 677,
701 (1947) (imposition of criminal contempt sanctions governed by "extent of the
willful and deliberate defiance of the court's order, the seriousness of the consequences of
the contumacious behavior, the necessity of effectively terminating the defendant's de-
fiance as required by the public interest, and the importance of deterring such acts in
the future') ; Bessette v. NV. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904) (contempt by non-
party); Reeder v. Morton-Gregson Co., 296 Fed. 785 (C.C.A. 8th 1924) (contempt of
restraining order as opposed to mandatory order) ; Proudfit Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalama-
zoo Loose Leaf Binder Co., 230 Fed. 120, 132 (C.C.A. 6th 1916) (absence of good
faith); In re Rice, 181 Fed. 217 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1910) (deliberateness); In re La-
Varre, 48 F.2d 216 (S.D. Ga. 1930) (fraud); see Gompers v. Bucks' Stove and Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911) (special elements of contumacy) ; In re Eskay, 122 F.2d
819 (C.C.A. 3d 1941) (no general substantive formula); Moskovitz, Contempt of In-
jwwtcions, 43 CoL L. REv. 780 (1943).
Of course, contumacy non-injurious to the adverse party presents no difficulty of
distinction since, if contempt at all, it is criminal. General misbehavior not constituting
disobedience appears to have been placed in this category, although it is conceivable that
the adverse party might be severely affected thereby. See note 97 infra.
94. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 900 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§78u(c) (1940) (maximum fine of $1000, or term of imprisonment of one year, or
both); -Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U.S.C. §387 (1940) (maximum fine of
$1000, or term of imprisonment of six months, or both).
95. United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 716 (1947) (concurring
opinion by Black, J., and Douglas, J.) ; id. at 737 (dissenting opinion by Rutledge, J.). Had
defendant Lewis been punished under the War Labor Disputes Act rather than for criminal
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SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL CONTEMPT
On the civil contempt side are grouped the "remedial" sanctions supposed
to inure directly to the benefit of the contempt plaintiff. At least where com-
pensation to a private litigant is awarded, the proceeding is closely analogous
to the ordinary civil action for damages 8 and should be available to redress
private injuries suffered by reason of the contemnor's misbehavior as well as
his disobedience. 7
The inadequacy or failure of compensation, however, requires further
measures of coercive relief designed to secure obedience, not all of which
are even technically considered contempt sanctions. The failure of a party to
comply upon order with certain of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may
deprive him of substantial rights of litigation: pleadings may be stricken,
evidence excluded, proceedings stayed or dismissed, or judgment taken by
default.98 Legal enforcement of a judgment for the payment of money may
be secured by a writ of execution upon the property of the judgment debtor
or if the applicable state practice or procedure so provides by "body execu-
tion": conditional imprisonment ;99 legal enforcement of a judgment for the
contempt, the maximum fine which could have been imposed was $5000 with the possible ad-
dition of one year of imprisonment.
96. It has been unconsciously suggested that quasi contempt is a more appropriate de-
scription for an action of this kind. See RAPALJE, CONTE-Mpr §21 (1884).
97. No federal cases have been found unequivocally awarding compensatioh for
contempt consisting of misbehavior as opposed to disobedience of a court order issued
on behalf of a complainant. See In re Sixth and Wisconsin Tower, Inc., 108 F.2d 538,
540 (C.C.A. 7th 1939). But cf. Odell v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359
(C.C.A. 7th 1937) ; Chicago Directory Co. v. United States Directory Co., 123 Fed, 194
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903). That there should be no objection to such a practice, see Mont-
gomery, Fines For Contempt as Indemnity to a Party to an Action, 16 MINN. L. REv.
791 (1932).
The notion of disobedience may be stretched, however, by means of the "implied
court order" or by an express decree impliedly binding others than the parties. In this
manner, interference with property in custodia legis has been successfully rationalized
under the disobedience provision of the federal contempt statute. Lineker v, Dillon,
275 Fed. 460, 470 (N.D. Cal. 1921) (alternate holding) ; Clay v. Waters, 178 Fed. 385,
394 (C.C.A. 8th 1910) ; Cf. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932) ; Converse v. High-
way Construction Co., 107 F.2d 127 (C.C.A. 6th 1939). But cf. Hart Inv. Co. v. Great
Eastern Oil Co., 27 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Tex. 1939) (alternate holding).
For compensatory fines for disobedience assessed as damages rather than as a sub-
stituted criminal penalty, see, e.g., Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S.
448 (1932); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923); Parker
v. United States, 135 F.2d 54 (C.C.A. 1st 1943) cert. denied, 320 U.S. 737 (1943);
Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F.2d 910 (C.C.A. 7th 1930); Coca-Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F.
Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Cf. §14c(16) of the National Bankruptcy Act under
which a bankrupt may be denied a discharge for disobedience to a lawful court order.
52 STAT. 850 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §32c(6) (1940).
99. FED. R. CIrv. P. 69, B.I.P. (Export), Limited v. Isaacs, 10 F. Supp. 872
(S.D.N.Y. 1935); 3 MooRE, FEDERIAL PRAcrncz §69.02 (1938).
[Vol. 57 : 83
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
abatement of a nuisance or the transfer of title, by the independent action of
court officers or by force of the judgment itself. 0 0 Finally, equitable enforce-
ment of a judgment of mandatory or continuing injunctive relief may be
secured by contempt as such: conditional imprisonment and, by extension, a
conditional fine. The latter are included among the civil sanctions under the
Gompers doctrine, provided the court is not "punishing yesterday's contemp-
tuous conduct" but rather "announcing the consequences of tomorrow's
contumacious conduct,"' 0' on the theory that the contemnor carries the "keys
to his prison"'0 2 and something more than vicarious satisfaction may result
to a private contempt plaintiff. Under these circumstances at least, unlike
criminal contempt, the need for a procedure highly favorable to the defendant
through which the injured party must seek his relief is not immediately ap-
parent.
In fact the federal courts have gone so far as to deny a trial by jury to the
civil contemnor under circumstances where a reasonable construction of the
Clayton Act would have permitted it.1'03 The doubt of constitutionality said
to preclude its application to civil contempt when the Act was interpreted for
the first time by the Supreme Court' °4 may be justified only if the "equity"
jurisdiction conferred by Article III is construed to guarantee a trial by the
court;105 for it would be an illusory guarantee to ensure a court trial for a
determination of the complainant's right to relief while permitting a jury to
determine his right to the remedy. Such a strained construction, however,
seems scarcely destined to survive its exposure in the federal courts 1 for it
would, of course, apply inter alia to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 70, Clarke v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 62 F2d 440 (C.C.A.
10th 1932) cert. denicd, 290 U.S. 629 (1933) ; cf. Blackmer v. United States, 24 U.S.
421 (1932) (writ of execution against property of one who failed to respond to sub-
poena) ; 3 MooRE; FEDERAL PRAcricE §§ 70.01, 70.02 (1938).
101. Mr. Justice Douglas in Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup. Ct. 918, 923 (1947).
102. Judge Sanborn in his oft-quoted decision, It re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 461 (C.C.A.
8th 1902), is usually given credit for conceiving this metaphor which has bedevilled the
law of contempt and influenced the almost universal classification of coercive relief as a
civil remedy through Gompers v. Bucks' Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
It was actually borrowed, however, from a Pennsylvania decision, Passmore Williamson's
Case, 26 Pa. 9, 24 (1855), where it served to describe a penalty deliberately classified as
criminal. A similar paradox appears from Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. & M.
639, 39 Eng. Rep. 538 (Ch. 1831), reputed source of the civil-criminal distinction in
equity, where the coercive imprisonment of a member of parliament was justified be-
cause his contempt was criminal and not ivil. Such is the foundation upon which is
erected a new precept of "immemorial usage." See Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal
and Civil, 21 HA.v. L. REv. 161, 167 (1908).
103. See note 66 supra.
104. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 64 (1924).
105. Michigan, Wisconsin, Utah, and South Dakota have so construed their con-
stitutions. See CLAK , CODE PLEADING 102 (2d ed. 1947).
106. But cf. Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Chil, 21 HMv. L. Rv. 161,
174 (1908), whose conclusions are cited with approval by Justices Black and Doug-
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But as restrictions have accrued upon the power to punish criminal con-
tempt, there has been increasing resort to the less inhibited coercive contempt
sanctions. Hence an undiscriminating classification of the latter as a civil
remedy may conceal the need for adequate safeguards.
There may be extrinsic reasons for a special limitation on, the use of such
sanctions. For example, the state law governing "imprisonment for debt" and
"'body execution," mandatory in the federal courts,' r frequently precludes
coercive imprisonment in actions ex contractic although permitting its use in
tort actions where fraud or malice is established, an implied recognition that it
is not merely a means of civil execution but a mode of punishment for a
wrong committed as well.' 0 8
In the second place, the mere substitution of the government for the private
contempt plaintiff would seem to call for at least some of the restrictions
evolved to protect the criminally accused. This may occur, for example, when-
ever the sovereign in an effort to control testimony irregularity invokes, in-
stead of an ineffective or too restricted criminal penalty, the sanctions of civil
contempt. Although under the Hudgings doctrine the court may not, via the
contempt process, reach ordinary perjury, perjury which has become suffi-
ciently evasive to block the inquiry or an outright refusal of testimony may be
so punished.' 0 Such punishment normally takes the form of an uncondi-
tional penalty." 0 But, unlike the situation confronting the court in the case of
unequivocally false testimony where its discovery may simultaneously nullify
its obstructive tendency, the temptation is strong to apply a judicial "thumb-
screw" in order to overcome the resistance of a recalcitrant witness; punish-
ment may yield to coercive sanctions in an apparent transposition from crimi-
las in United Mine Workers v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 715 (1947) (concurring
opinion). The author, favoring a jury trial for criminal contempt, nevertheless opposes
its extension to proceedings for "merely preventive imprisonment" and suggests that
"statutes which commit the trial of questions of fact in such process to a jury are not
likely permanently to prove satisfactory." Query, whether a similar attitude embraces
proieedings for a compensatory fine.
Once the wounded dignity of the court is abstracted from the criteria affecting a
choice of fact-finding agency, the mere circumstance that coercive relief is to be imposed
scarcely seems to dictate arbitrarily a trial by the court in every such case, so long as
a jury continues to be considered competent to try anything at all.
107. Rav. STAT. §§ 990-2 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §§843-5 (1940); FED. R. Civ. P. 69.
108. See, e.g., Coryell v. Lawson, 25 Colo. App. 432, 139 Pac. 25 (1914) ; Mozorosky
v. Hurlburt, 106 Ore. 274, 281, 211 Pac. 893 (1923),; Ex parle Berry, 85 S.C. 243, 67
S.E. 225 (1910); cf. Ex parte John Hardy, 68 Ala. 303 (1881). See also Notes, 33
A.L.R. 648, 652 (1924), 54 L.R.A. (N.s.) 645 (1915), 34 L.R.A. 634 (1897).
109. See pp. 89-90 supra.
110. See, e.g., Schleier v. United States, 72 F.2d 414 (C.C.A. 2d 1934) (three months
imprisonment for evasive answers before grand jury); Haimsohn v. United States, 2
F.2d 441 (C.C.A. 6th 1924) (three months imprisonment for evasive answers before a
referee); Davidson v. Wilson, 286 Fed. 108 (C.C.A. 3d 1923) (three months imprison-
ment for refusal to testify before referee);, cf.'United States v. Appel, 211 Fed. 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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nal to civil contempt. The perversity of such a consequence must have
troubled the federal court which, eight years after the Gompers test was
propounded, approved the indefinite confinement of a grand jury witness
conditional upon his continuing refusal to testify, but held criminal the con-
tempt."' Further application of contingent sanctions where criminal con-
tempt is tacitly assumed may be found in punishment for evasive answers
before a grand jury. 12 Similarly, in bankruptcy proceedings where informa-
tion as to the status of the debtor's assets is essential, recalcitrant bankrupts
have been imprisoned for fixed terms with the opportunity to purge them-
selves.113 In view of a recent suggestion, however, that testimony not suffi-
ciently obstructive to warrant a proceeding in criminal contempt might yet
support coercive sanctions imposed in a civil proceeding," 4 attention should be
redirected to the ground for the Hudgings restriction on the contempt power
lest, reinterpreted under the policy of the Nye decision, emphasis be placed
exclusively upon that of preserving a trial by jury in criminal cases. For, in
the Hudgings case, the coercive imprisonment of an evasive witness to exact
"a character of testimony which the court would deem to be truthful" was
denounced without characterizing the proceeding. 11
Another use of coercive sanctions by the sovereign is the collection of a
penal fine by the conditional incarceration of the offender. This mode of en-
forcement cannot without some distortion be deemed in civil contempt al-
though in the case of a fine payable to the complainant it would be so
regarded. However, since the proceedings leading up to a penal fine would be
criminal in nature anyway, the classification in this instance is not material.
Invasion of the civil contempt domain by the sovereign is not, moreover,
confined to the courts. Officially sanctioned for the first time in 1939,110 a
federal agency may, as a private contempt plaintiff, secure the more effective
111. Gill v. United States, 262 Fed. 502 (C.C.A. 2d 1919); cf. Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273 (1919).
112. Lang v. United States, 55 F.2d 922 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); O'Connell v. United
States, 40 F.2d 201 (C.C.A. 2d 1930).
113. In re Rosenblum, 268 Fed. 381 (W.D. Mo. 1919); In re Schulman, 177 Fed.
191 (C.C.A. 2d 1910).
114. See In re Fox, 96 F.2d 23, 25 (C.C.A. 3d 1938) ; cf. Stein v. United States, 9
F.2d 68 (C.C.A. 9th 1925) reversing 7 F.2d 169 (N.D. Calif. 1925); In re Blitz, 232
Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1916).
115. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 384 (1919) ; see notes 39-44 supra. "The rea-
sons which forbid such procedure go very deep into the past. Even when men did not
wince at the most awful sanctions, the evidence procured was regarded with suspicion.
A man, faced with perpetual imprisonment till he discloses his confederates, will in the
end find confederates to disclose. There is no modem engine to effect the result; the
costs are'too high, and the results too meager." Judge Learned Hand in Loubriel v.
United States, 9 F.2d 807, 809 (C.C.A. 2d 1926). After citing the Hudgings case, Judge
Clark, in In re Eskay, 122 F.2d 819, 824 (C.C.A. 3d 1941), concluded that "a criminal
contempt is the remedy appropriate to false swearing by evasion."
116. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939).
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civil remedies in aid of law enforcement. There is the famous case of
Howard Parker who was imprisoned for a "debt" owing to the Federal
Marketing Administrator which was subsequently proved in bankruptcy. The
"debt" was originally incurred as a compensatory fine for contempt of a
mandatory injunction secured by the Administrator to compel obedience to a
federal law.11" All proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure. More recently, in Penfield Co. v. SEC,"5s the Securities
and Exchange Commission brought civil contempt proceedings against a cor-
poration officer who failed to comply with an enforcement order for a sub-
poena duces tecum. The subpoena had been issued to assist in determining
the advisability of preferring criminal charges against the corporation. 11
Adhering strictly to the rule promulgated for the protection of contemnors
that punishment for criminal contempt may not be imposed in a civil pro-
ceeding, the Circuit Court with subsequent Supreme Court approval set aside
an insignificant fine of $50 imposed by the lower court and directed that the
contemnor be imprisoned until he should produce the subpoenaed docu-
ments; °120 an incidental effect of the change in terminology from "criminal"
to "civil" was to preclude a review on the merits to the defendant.
121
Ultimately, the Attorney General was permitted to make use of the civil
contempt facilities, and in the Mineworkers case he secured a coercive fine
of $2,800,000 to compel obedience to a labor injunction. 2 2 It seems to have
been agreed upon all sides that such a fine would have been quite properly
inflicted without the safeguards said to be necessitated by the imposition of
a criminal fine in the same proceeding. If this be so, attention should be di-
rected to the confusion evidenced by the lower court which had originally
imposed only an unconditional fine computed at the rate of $250,000 per day
for the fourteen days during which disobedience had already been in prog-
ress. 23 Unless the fine was an attempt to assess damages for the loss suffered
by the United States, the only feasible explanation for the lower court's de-
scription of its sanction as both civil and criminal 2 4 is that it was er-
117. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370 (C.C.A. 1st 1942), 135 F.2d 54 (1943)
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 737 (1943), 153 F.2d 66 (1946).
118. 67 Sup. Ct. 918 (1947).
119. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (C.C.A. 9th 1944).
120. SEC v. Penfield Co., 157 F.2d 65 (C.C.A. 9th 1946), 59 HARv. L. Rsv. 1311
(1946); cf. E. Ingraham Co. v. Germanow, 4 F.2d 1002 (C.C.A. 2d 1925).
121. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup. Ct. 918, 923 (1947). Defendant, of course, did not
appeal from the criminal fine. Since the Securities and Exchange Commission did not
seek review until after the period for criminal appeals had expired, only a question of
the proper sanction was at issue. Even the dissenting opinion stressed, however, that
there was "not the faintest denial of any safeguard or of appropriate procedural pro-
tection" to the defendant. Id. at 930.
122. United Mine Workers v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 702 (1947).
123. United States v. United Mine Workers, 70 F. Supp. 42, 53 (D.D.C. 1947);
Asst. Atty. Gen'l. John F. Sonnett, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1946, p. 4, col. 3.
124. United States v. United Mine Workers, 70 F. Supp. 42, 52 (D.D.C. 1947).
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roneouslyl - regarded as coercive. But the error is significant; for the pos-
sibility that coercive relief may become actual punishment is necessarily pres-
ent in every civil contempt proceeding. At least where the contest is with
the sovereign, therefore, assurance of some additional safeguards would
seem appropriate.
But even in an action commenced by a private litigant, unrestricted use of
the coercive contempt sanctions may result in deviation from the civil role
assigned them. For if the contumacy be carried to the point of actual im-
prisonment or of absolute liability to a fine, it is punished quite as effectively
as if subject to these penalties at the outset.' 0G Whether it will in fact be
carried so far depends upon: 1) the alternative consequences of compliance
faced by the contemnor, and 2) the possibility of his performance. Unless
his refusal to obey an order of the court is based upon sheer stubbornness in
which event the metaphor is probably appropriate, he may not actually possess
the "keys to his prison".
Illustrative of the abuse which may follow where coercive sanctions are im-
posed in an ordinary civil proceeding is the dilemma often confronting the
debtor subject to a bankruptcy turnover order T Adopting the rule that
evidence of ability to comply with such an order must be "dear and con-
-vincing" to support coercive imprisonment for contempt, the Supreme Court,
in Oriel v. Russell,112 s admitted that the stricter standard of proof required
in criminal cases would "render the bankruptcy system less effective. ' ' m  The
Second Circuit, however, has recently criticized the Oriel rule as applied
within its own jurisdiction.' 30 In holding that proof of ability to comply with
a turnover order had been established to the required degree by an unrebutted
125. But see Comment, 45 MicH. L. Rav. 469, 495-6 (1947). Nov. 21, 1946, the Dis-
-trict Court issued its rule to show cause ordering that "if upon the return of said de-
fendants it should be found that the alleged contempt was not sufficiently purged, a trial
-should be held on November 27, 1946.. .. " United'States v. United Mine Vorkers,
'70 F. Supp. 42,49 (D.D.C. 1946).
126. See Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 CoL L. Rzv. 956,
-961 (1932). "It is in effect a civil levy of emecution which may include body execution.
But I venture to say that every 'civil' contempt whose contumacy is carried to the point at
-which the contemnor may be committed is a 'criminal' contempt as well.....:
127. Compare the similar dilemma confronting the contemnor in Parker v. United
States, 126 F.2d 370 (C.C.A. 1st 1942), 135 F.2d 54 (1943) cert. denied, 320 U.S. 737
(1943), 153 F.2d 66 (1946).
128. 278 U.S. 358 (1929); cf. Telling v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 77 F.2d 584
•(C.C.A. 6th 1935) cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935); Coca-Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F.
Supp. 364 (S.D. Te-- 1934).
129. Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 365 (1929). In accord is the attitude of creditors.
.See Tolins, Contempt in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 1 Ax. BANnm. REv. 141 (1924);
Siegel, Contempt in Bankruptcy Cases, 4 Am. BAwiu. REv. 297 (1928).
130. See In re Luma Camera Service, 157 F.2d 951, 953 (C.C.A. 2d 1946) cert.
_granted sub. wm. Maggio v. Zeitz, 67 Sup. Ct. 970 (1947) ; Seligson v. Goldsmith, 128
.F.2d 977, 978 (C.C.A. 2d 1942); Robbins v. Gottbetter, 134 F.2d 843, 844 (C.C.A. 2d
-1943) ; cf. Kattelman v. Madden, 88 F.2d 858 (C.C.A. 8th 1937).
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"presumption of continued possession" by the bankrupt of the property in is-
sue, Judge Frank, speaking for the court, 131 vigorously invited reversal.
Through such fictional evidence, he said, the court without a jury may punish
the bankrupt, faced with the incriminating alternative of explaining his de-
fault, for the crime of concealing his assets or swearing falsely and at the
same time induce "close relatives and friends to put up the money" ;182 he
deplored the impropriety of coercing friends and relatives and denounced the
substitution of a civil proceeding for a criminal trial. While the degree of
proof under these circumstances scarcely appears to be "clear and convinc-
ing", 33 it is not an illogical outgrowth of the rigid civil classification affixed
to coercive imprisonment.?
3 4
There is no reason to assume that such a perversion of civil relief is con-
fined to bankruptcy turnover orders. 3 5 On the contrary, it may well be
presumed to exist wherever compulsion of an affirmative order has been
translated into actual fine or imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
The effective administration of justice in any court requires a variety of
sanctions to secure order and obedience. These are all designed to coerce
desirable conduct or to deter undesirable conduct, but they may frequently
prove ineffective to accomplish their primary purpose and serve only to punish.
131. In re Luma Camera Service Co. supra note 130.
132. Id. at 953.
133. That Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929), does not require the effect given
to the "presumption of continued possession" by the Second Circuit, see Brune v. Fraidin,
149 F.2d 325 (C.C.A. 4th 1945).
134. Cf. Judge Augustus W. Hand, concurring in Robbins v. Gottbetter, 134 F.2d 843,
844 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).
135. The turnover order is, oT course, one step removed from the actual imposition
of coercive sanctions. But if safeguards are required for the turnover proceeding, a
fortiori should they be required for the contempt proceeding. The point in any litigation
at which the law and facts necessary to support a contempt judgment are determined will
naturally vary with the subject litigated and may vary with the circuit of trial. Compare
In re Gordon & Gelberg, 69 F.2d 81 (C.C.A. 2d 1934), In re J. L. Marks & Co., 85
F.2d 392 (C.C.A. 7th 1936) (facts litigated at turnover proceeding include the present
ability of bankrupt to perform, relegating to a contempt proceeding, only facts subte-
quently affecting his ability), with In re Eisenberg, 130 F.2d 160 (C.C.A. 3d 1942) (facts
litigated at turnover proceeding include ability of bankrupt to perform at time petition
in bankruptcy filed resulting in greater scope for the contempt proceeding). See 2 Cot.-
Lma, BANKRuPrcY 520-1 (14th ed. 1940, Supp. 1946). Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson con-
curring in Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1129, 1136 (1947)
(emphasizing that although the safeguards "of a full hearing" should be available in
at least one stage of administrative subpoena enforcement, this might be appropriate
during either the administrative, court enforcement order, or contempt phase of the proc-
ess). It would seem desirable, however, that the questions necessary to be resolved at
a contempt proceeding should be kept to a minimum in view of a general prejudice
against collateral attack upon "final" judgments.
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In the event that the ultimate punishment is itself directly beneficial to the
interests of a private party or to the contractual or property interests of the
government in a quasi-private capacity, such as a compensatory fine, the legal
consequences of a civil contempt classification may be not inappropriate. Un-
der other circumstances, it is submitted, contempt sanctions are essentially
penal varying only in the degree of imminence of punishment necessary to
exert the "least possible power adequate to the end proposed."'3̂0 If uncon-
ditionally imposed at the outset, they are identical in nature to the penalties
evoked by any other offense against the United States, and, unless the con-
tempt is witnessed by the judge in open court and requires no collateral ex-
planation, 37 it would seem reasonable that it be punished in the same manner
as an ordinary crime. This would also eliminate in many cases the need for
"meticulous regard for those separate categories of offenses . . . so that
the instances where there is no right to jury trial will be narrowly re-
stricted."' 3s If, because of the fortuitous circumstance that the contempt re-
sults from failure to take affirmative action, an opportunity is given to the
offender to purge himself, the risks of abuse may be less. When this factor is
coupled with potential assistance to a private litigant, sufficient justification
may be found for the discretionary application of civil principles of law.
But the mere fact that the government is permitted in a la,., enforcement
proceeding to invoke the more effective coercive sanctions should not so change
the character of the proceeding as to strip the offender of the protection to
which he would otherwise be entitled were he guilty of irremediable miscon-
duct. Whether the objective is to secure a criminal trial in certain cases of
contempt as Justice Rutledge insists, or merely to maintain "due process of
law" for all contemnors as Justices Frankfurter and Jackson recommend, the
encouraged resort to coercive relief thus warrants attention lest outworn
concepts obscure the way. Always more effective, if at all appropriate, its
uncritical classification as a civil remedy may conceal the very problem whose
solution is sought.
136. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (U.S. 1821).
137. "Open court" might be considered to include, e.g., referees, a grand jury, or
certain administrative boards, even though the power to punish remains exclusively
with the judge.
138. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 49 (1941).
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